Gambling for resurrection is a situation that arises in international relations when a weak leader is willing to gamble that another power will take him back and extend the war. Often, this is the case when a power is on the brink of a collapse, and the weaker leader wants to prolong the war by taking any risk that might make it more difficult to win the war. But can this approach work? It seems unlikely to me, so let’s look at why it can go wrong.
In international relations, a gambling for resurrection occurs when a weakened leader risks prolonging a war to make himself look more powerful. It is a risky strategy, but it can result in positive results. It can also create a very volatile situation in which a leader’s political future may be at stake. The risks and rewards of a gambling for resurrection situation are difficult to calculate, and the results of a successful outcome may be uncertain, and the risk-taking might be very high.
The gambling for resurrection theory challenges conventional wisdom by positing that leaders target powerful states in order to show their competence and strength to their constituents. Moreover, it offers substantial support for a new theory of diversionary war, which posits that leaders may be motivated by unpopular leaders. Regardless of the theory’s empirical basis, it has the potential to help understand the dynamics of conflict in our own country. The debate on diversionary war is an excellent opportunity for scholars to compare the competing theories.
